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Abstract:
Recent work on money and endogenous growth ¯nds modest welfare costs of in°a-
tion. Furthermore, high in°ation reduces the growth rate. We present a monetary
endogenous growth model with labor market frictions in the form of search unem-
ployment which is calibrated for the US economy. Interestingly, both employment
and the growth rate may even increase with the rate of in°ation depending on
the elasticity of labor supply. Considering the transition dynamics following a
change in the monetary policy, the optimal quarterly in°ation rate is found to
amount to approximately 3.5% in the benchmark case. A reduction of the in°a-
tion rate from its optimal value to zero results in a welfare loss equal to 0.3% of
total consumption.1 Introduction
The welfare costs of in°ation have attracted attention in recent literature on
endogenous growth. In these models, money is commonly introduced using
a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. High in°ation reduces the return from
working as income earned in the previous period cannot be spent until the
next period. As a consequence, households substitute leisure for labor and the
growth rate declines. In Gomme (1993), endogenous growth arises through
human capital accumulation as in Lucas (1988,1990). Gomme ¯nds modest
welfare costs of in°ation. In particular, a 10% money growth rate (8.5%
in°ation rate) results in welfare costs of no more than 0.03% of income. Wu
and Zhang (1998) analyze a monetary endogenous growth model of Romer
(1986). They ¯nd signi¯cant welfare costs of in°ation in the range from half
to 5% points for an annual monetary growth of 10%. Di®erent from Gomme
(1993), the growth rate e®ect is important in their model.
We also analyze an endogenous growth model as suggested by Romer (1986).
Money is introduced using a CIA constraint. In addition to existing work
on monetary endogenous growth models, we introduce labor market frictions
building on the work of Pissarides (1990). Our results are in contrast with
the results from Gomme (1993) and Wu/Zhang (1998). In particular, money
growth increases employment and the growth rate in our benchmark case.
The optimal quarterly in°ation rate amounts to 3.5% implying welfare gains
of 0.3% of total consumtpion compared to the zero-in°ation economy. Hence,
the magnitude of the welfare e®ects is approximately equal to the one found
by Wu/Zhang (1998), but of opposite sign.
Our surprising results are caused by the consideration of labor market fric-
tions. Unemployment results from time-consuming and costly matching of
vacancies with searching agents. Following a rise in the in°ation rate, agents
substitute search for leisure, similar to the leisure-labor substitution e®ect in
the endogenous growth models of Gomme (1993) and Wu/Zhang (1998), who
assume Walrasian labor markets instead. The reduction in search e®ort re-
duces the probability of ¯rms to ¯ll a job and tends to decrease employment.
However, in our model, there is also an opposing employment-enhancing
e®ect from a rise in the rate of in°ation. High in°ation also reduces the
level of consumption (relative to the one of capital) as agents substitute real
money balances and capital as in Tobin (1965). In our economy, wages result
1from decentralized Nash bargaining. Following a decline in consumption, the
reservation wage of the households and, hence, the bargained wage decrease.1
Consequently, ¯rms increase their vacancies, which boosts employment. The
net e®ect of a rise of in°ation on employment is positive for our benchmark
calibration of the model for the US economy.
In addition to existing literature on monetary endogenous growth, we will
not only introduce labor market frictions in order to study the welfare costs
of in°ation, but we will also account for the transition dynamics following
a change in the money growth rate. Recent quantitative evaluations of pol-
icy measures ¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect of transition dynamics on welfare. For
example, Lucas (1990) analyzes the abolition of capital income taxes in an
endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. In steady state,
the change in welfare amounts to a 3% consumption equivalent increase. As
demonstrated by GrÄ uner/Heer (2000), also considering the transition from
the old to the new steady state reduces the welfare gain of such a policy to 1%
of total consumption. Furthermore, in our model of search unemployment,
the transition dynamics and hence welfare results may be di®erent from the
one in standard models with Walrasian labor markets. Typically, welfare is
measured by life-time utility of the households which is a function of leisure
and consumption. Following a policy change, consumption and leisure im-
mediately adjust in standard endogenous growth models, ie they are jump
variables. In particular, employment and consumption may even overshoot
their new steady state values as shown by GrÄ uner/Heer (2000). However, in
the presence of labor market frictions, employment behaves fundamentally
di®erent and only adjusts gradually to the new steady state, ie employment
is a sluggish variable. Consequently, the magnitude of instantaneous utility
during transition di®ers signi¯cantly from the one in the new steady state
and the analysis of balanced-growth path without any further consideration
of the transition might even lead to the wrong policy conclusion.
Our model follows the search unemployment model of Shi/Wen (1999) with
two extensions: ¯rst, we introduce money using a cash-in-advance constraint.
And second, endogenous growth is introduced into the model with the help of
a production technology which displays constant returns in (social) capital.
1To be more speci¯c, the level of consumption and wages fall. On the balanced growth
path, however, consumption and wage will grow at a higher rate.
2The complete model is presented in section 2. The model is calibrated for
the US economy using standard parameters from applied general equilibrium
studies. Section 3 presents a balanced-growth analysis. As one major result,
in°ation is shown to possibly increase the growth rate in the presence of
search unemployment and wage bargaining. In section 4, the welfare costs of
in°ation are analyzed explicitly accounting for the transition dynamics. As
our second major result, the optimal in°ation rate is shown to be well above
zero for realistic values of labor market parameters. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model introduces money demand and endognous growth in the search
model of Shi/Wen (1999). Three sectors can be distinguished: households,
¯rms, and the monetary authority. The representative household maximizes
his expected intertemporal utility subject to his budget constraint. Firms
produce a consumption-investment good using capital and labor. Labor mar-
kets are subject to frictions as matching vacancies with searching workers is
a time-consuming transaction. Wages are bargained and deviate from the
marginal product of labor. Money is incorparated using a cash-in-advance
constraint.
2.1 Households
Households are of measure one. The representative household consists of
di®erent members who pool their receipts. Agents either work, search for
a job, or enjoy leisure. Let n denote the share of agents working, s the
share of agents searching, and 1 ¡ n ¡ s denote the unemployed agents not
actively searching for a job. n, s, and 1 ¡ n ¡ s can also be interpretated
as the number of employed agents, the number of unemployed agents, and
the agents who are out of the labor force. All variables are indexed by time,
which is continuous. For convenience, we omit the time index. Furthermore,
working n and searching s is assumed to cause disutility to the agents.















where c and ½ denote consumption and the discount rate of the household,
respectively.
As a distinguishing feature of this economy, employment n changes only
gradually:
_ n = qs ¡ µn; (2)
where q denotes the probability of the searching agents to ¯nd a job. The
individual agents take q as given, while it is determined endogenously in the
labor market. Finding a job takes time. As a possible explanation, workers
and ¯rms are placed in di®erent locations or the screening and dissemina-
tion of information is a time-consuming activity. Furthermore, workers are
separated from their job at the rate µ, which is given exogenously.
Households face two constraints, a budget constraint and a cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint. They receive income from capital k, labor n, pro¯ts -,
and real lump-sum transfers ¿ from the monetary authority. Real assets a
consist of capital k and real money balances m and accumulate according to:
_ a = _ k + _ m = wn + rk + - + ¿ ¡c ¡ ¼m; (3)
where w, r, and ¼ denote the wage rate, the interest rate, and the in°ation
rate, respectively. The initial endowments at time zero k0 and n0 are given.
The consumption good c consists of Ãc cash goods and (1¡Ã)c credit goods.
Purchases of the cash good are subject to the CIA constraint:
ÃPc · Pm; (4)
where P denotes the price level with ¼ ´
_ P
P . Since the analysis only considers
the situation ¼ ¸ 0 > ¡r, equation (4) will always hold as an equality at an
optimum.
In the case of an interior solution, s;n;1¡n¡s > 0, the ¯rst-order conditions
of the household are given by:
_ c
c






4q¸n = ¯(s + n)
´¡1; (6)







where ¸n denotes the current value shadow price of employment to the house-
hold. Equations (5) and (7) describe the dynamics of consumption c and the
current value shadow price of employment, ¸n. According to equation (6),
the marginal bene¯t of search, q¸n, is equal to the marginal cost of search,
¯(s + n)´¡1.
2.2 The monetary authority




The seignorage obtained from money creation is paid to the households as a
lump-sum transfer implying:
¿ = ¹m: (9)
2.3 Firms
Firms are identical and of measure one. They use labor n and capital k
in order to produce the consumption-investment good y with the technology
f(k; ¹ k;n). The externality in aggregate capital accumulation ¹ k (which equals
k in equilibrium) results in constant returns to capital as in Romer (1986):




y can either be consumed by the households or accumulated.







5where pro¯ts are given by:
- = f(k;n;¹ k) ¡(r + ±)k ¡ wn ¡ ·wv: (12)
Firms take the interest rate r and the wage rate w as given. Capital depre-
ciates at the rate ±. The cost of maintaining a number v of job vacancies
is proportional to the wage rate w, the proportionality factor being denoted
by ·. The vacancy costs ·wv represent real costs of production for hiring,
screening, or training of workers.
Workers separate from a job at rate µ. The individual ¯rm takes the rate # at
which a vacancy is ¯lled as given. The ¯rm's employment evolves according
to:
_ n = #v ¡ µn: (13)
The maximization conditions of the ¯rm are as follows:
fk(k;n;¹ k) = r + ±; (14)
·w = ¸F#; (15)
_ ¸F = (µ + r)¸F ¡
³
fn(k;n;¹ k) ¡ w
´
; (16)
where ¸F and fi(k;n;¹ k) denote the current value shadow price of employment
to the ¯rm and the marginal product of i, i = k;n, respectively. According
to the optimal decision on the capital stock k, equation (14), the marginal
product of capital equals the interest rate r plus depreciation ±. In equation
(15), the marginal cost of a vacancy v is equated to its marginal bene¯t. The
dynamics of the current value shadow price of employment ¸F are described
in equation (16).
2.4 Matching and wage determination
Labor markets are subject to frictions and are characterized by two-sided
search. Time is needed in order to match vacancies with searching work-
ers. Furthermore, there is an externality from searching and posting a va-
cancy. An increase in the number of searchers reduces the probability of other
6searching agents to ¯nd a job, while it increases the probability of ¯rms to
¯ll their vacancies. Vice versa, an additional vacancy increases the probabil-
ity of a searching agent to get a job, while it reduces the probability of the
other ¯rms to ¯ll a vacancy. Thus, a negative externality arises whenever
the number of active agents increases on the same side of the market and a
positive externality arises if the number of agents increases on the other side
of the market.
In order to simplify notation, let v and s also denote the aggregate numbers
of vacancies and searching agents, respectively. The number of aggregate
matches L is an increasing function of both aggregate vacancies v and ag-
gregate searching agents s. If no vacancy is posted (v = 0), no jobs can be
matched, L = 0. Similarly, if agents are not searching for a job (s = 0),
L = 0. In particular, the °ow of job matches L is described by the following
constant returns to scale technology:
L = L0v
°s
1¡°; L0 > 0; 0 < ° < 1: (17)
The job ¯nding rate of the searching agents is given by q = L
s, while the ¯rms
¯ll a vacancy at rate # =
L
v. In equilibrium, the number of agents ¯nding a
job is equal to the number of ¯lled vacancies, #v = qs.
Wages result from decentralized bargaining between the ¯rm and the mar-
ginal worker. Both the ¯rm and the worker receive a rent from a successful
match. More speci¯cally, the wage is determined by Nash bargaining which










where ¸ measures the bargaining power of the workers. The term ¯(s+n)´¡1c
can be interpreted as the agent's reservation wage.2
The wage as resulting from the Nash bargaining problem is given by:
w = ¸fn(k;n;¹ k) + (1 ¡ ¸)¯(s + n)
´¡1c: (19)
The wage is lower than the marginal product of labor and exceeds the reser-
vation wage of the household. Accordingly, both agents share a rent, the
shares depending on the bargaining power ¸.
2For a discussion of the wage determination see Shi/Wen (1999).
72.5 Stationary competitive search equilibrium
De¯nition. The competitive search equilibrium is a collection of decision
rules fc;s;v;kg and prices fw;r;¼g such that
1. Individual variables equal aggregrate variables.
2. Households maximize their utility (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4).
3. Firms maximize pro¯ts (11) subject to (12) and (13).
4. Wages and interest rates are given by (19) and (14), respectively.
5. Assets accumulates according to (3).
6. Agents do not take into account the e®ect of their decisions on the
matching rates q and #: #v = qs.
7. Employment evolves according to (2).
8. Nominal money grows at the exogenous rate ¹.
9. The goods market clear:
_ k = f(k;n;¹ k) ¡ ±k ¡c ¡ ·wv: (20)
10. The externality in capital accumulation is equal to the aggregate capital
stock, ¹ k = k.
In the stationary equilibrium, our economy can be described with the help of
the initial endowment of labor n0 and capital k0 and the following dynamic
equations in the stationary variables ~ c ´
c
k, ¼, ~ ¸F ´
¸F
k , n, and ¸n:
~ c
~ c




















= r + µ ¡





1¡® ¡ ± ¡ ~ c ¡ ·~ wv
´
; (23)
_ n = qs ¡ #v; (24)







where the variables r, q, #, s, ~ w ´ w
k, and v are given by the non-linear
equations (6) and:
r = ®n
1¡® ¡ ±; (26)
~ w = ¸(1 ¡ ®)An
¡® + (1 ¡ ¸)¯(s + n)
´¡1~ c; (27)











The local behavior of the model's dynamics is studied by Shi/Wen (1997)
for the case of constant search intensity s. Given s = s0, the steady state is
proven to be locally stable if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=¾,
is su±ciently large. In the present model with endogenous search intensity
s, the stability of the steady state cannot be shown analytically but only
numerically for the speci¯c calibration used.
2.6 Calibration
The e®ects of a change in the in°ation rate (as resulting from a change in
the growth rate of money supply) cannot be studied analytically but only
numerically. For this reason, the model is calibrated in order to match char-
acteristics of the US economy. If not mentioned otherwise, our parameters
are taken from Shi/Wen (1999). The unit time length corresponds to one
quarter.
The production elasticity of private capital is set equal to ® = 0:25. Capital
depreciate at a rate of ± = 0:01. The parameter A is calibrated with the help
9Table 1
Calibration of parameter values for the US economy
Description Function Parameter
utility function U = lnc¡ ¯(s +n)
´ ¯ = 3:209, ´ = 3:5
time preference ½ ½ = 0:01
production function y = Ak®n1¡®¹ k1¡® A = 0:131, ® = 0:25
depreciation ± ± = 0:01
growth rate g = _ y=y g = 0:35%
vacancy costs ·vw · = 2:309
matching function L = L0v°s1¡° ° = 0:6, L0 = 1:0
job separation rate µ µ = 0:05
wage bargaining power ¸ ¸ = 0:4
money growth rate ¹ ¹ = 1:3%
CIA constraint Ãc · m Ã = 0:84
of equation (26). Output at time 0 is normalized to one. The steady-state
quarterly growth rate of output is set equal to g = 0:35%. The monetary
parameters of the model are taken from Cooley/Hansen (1995). The quar-
terly growth of money supply rate is set equal to ¹ = 0:013. The share of
consumption which is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint is set equal
to Ã = 0:84.
Following Shi/Wen (1999), the labor market parameters ¸, °, L0, and µ are
chosen as presented in table 1. The discount rate of the households is set
equal to ½ = 0:01, ´ is calibrated in order to obtain a labor supply elasticity of
² = 1=(´¡1) = 0:4. Furthermore, the value of ¯ = 3:209 and · = 2:309 imply
a steady state labor force participation ¹ s + ¹ n = 0:68 and an unemployment
rate ¹ s=(¹ s + ¹ n) = 0:06.
Our calibration implies a steady state quarterly in°ation rate ¼ = 0:95% and
a real quarterly interest rate r = 1:35%. The rate at which searching agents
¯nds a job and ¯rms ¯ll a vacancy amount to q = 0:783 and # = 1:177,
respectively. The endogenous value of the consumption-capital ratio is equal
to c=k = 0:0743.
102.7 Computation
In section 4, thetransition dynamics of employment n, the consumption/capital
ratio c=k, search intensity s, and vacancies v following a change in the money
growth rate ¹ are presented. In order to solve for the transition dynamics,
we have to solve a two-point boundary value problem. For the one sluggish
variable, n, the inital condition n0 is given. In the long run, the endogenous
variables approach their new steady state values. Accordingly, the endpoints
of all variables are known. Further, the new steady state is found to be
locally stable for all cases considered in this paper. The Jacobian matrix
of the di®erential equation system (21)-(25) has one negative and four posi-
tive eigenvalues. The numerical two-point boundary value problem is solved
with the method of reverse shooting.3 For this reason, we perturbated the
new steady state (~ c1;¼; ~ ¸F 1;n1; ~ ¸n1) by the magnitude of 10¡8 and moved
backwards in time (simply by solving the system _ x = ¡f(x) rather than
_ x = f(x)). The di®erential equation system was solved with the standard
Runge-Kutta method of order 4.
3 Balanced growth analysis
In this section, we study the properties of the balanced growth path. Along
the balanced growth path, the extensive variables c, k, y, w, and m grow
at constant rates, while the intensive variables such as search e®ort s, em-
ployment n, vacancies v, the rate of in°ation ¼, and the interest rate r are
constant. The e®ects of a change in the money growth rate on equilibrium
values of the endogenous variables are presented in ¯gure 1.
3A description of this technique is provided by Judd (1998).
11Figure 1: Balanced growth e®ects of the money growth rate ¹
Following a rise in the money growth rate ¹, the rate of in°ation ¼ goes up.
As a consequence, agents increase leisure by reducing their search e®ort s. For
given job ¯nding probability q, this e®ect reduces equilibrium employment
n = qs=µ. However, the job ¯nding probability q increases as ¯rms increase
their vacancies v. For the benchmark calibration, the latter e®ect dominates
and equilibrium employment increases. There are two opposing e®ects of
12a higher in°ation rate on the optimal number of posted vacancies. On the
one hand, there are less agents searching for a job reducing the rate # at
which ¯rms can ¯ll a vacancy. On the other hand, high in°ation reduces
the optimal level of consumption. Households substitute capital k for real
money balances m. As a consequence, both the marginal disutility from
working and the reservation wage decrease. According to (19), wages fall.
Even though the rate at which agents ¯ll their vacancies decreases, the fall
in wages induces ¯rms to increase their hiring activities.
The quantitative e®ects are modest. A 4% increase of the quarterly money
growth rate which corresponds to almost a 4% increase in the quarterly in-
°ation rate, raises employment by less than 1%. In equilibrium, the growth
rate is a simple positive function of employment, g = ®An1¡® ¡ ± ¡ ½. Ac-
cordingly, the growth rate increases as well. Following an increase of the
money growth rate from ¹ = 1:3% to ¹ = 2:3%, for example, the growth rate
rises from g = 0:350% to g = 0:352%.
Our qualitative results as presented in ¯gure 1 are robust with regard to the
choice of the parameters except for the two parameters ´ and °.4 If the labor
supply elasticity ² increases (ie ´ decreases), the decline of the search e®ort
s following a rise in in°ation is more pronounced. Similarly, a decline in the
elasticity of vacancy in job matches ° results in a smaller response of ¯rms'
vacacancy posting to lower wages w. As a consequence, for lower values of
´ and °, the employment e®ect as resulting from the decline in search e®ort
may overcompensate the employment e®ect stemming from the increase in
vacancies. Figure 2 illustrates the e®ects of money growth on equilibrium em-
ployment (and, hence, the growth rate of the economy) for (´;°) = (2:5;0:6)
and (´;°) = (3:5;0:4). For these two parameter combinations, equilibrium
employment n falls for higher rates of in°ation.
4More speci¯cally, following a change of either ¸ 2 f0:25;0:6g, · 2 f1;5g, or Ã 2
f0:25;1g, employment and growth are found to be a positive function of moderate money
growth rates ¹ 2 [0;0:04].
13Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for ´=2.5 and °=0.4
As our main result from the balanced-growth analysis, we concede that the
growth-maximizing monetary policy depends crucially on the elasticity of la-
bor supply and the elasticity of vacancies in job matches and may well imply
strictly positive in°ation rates.5 For both critical parameters, empirical esti-
mates vary considerably. Our benchmark case for the labor supply elasticity
² = 0:4 is taken from Killingsworth (1983) and has been applied by Shi/Wen
(1999) in computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis. Other CGE stud-
ies even apply higher values of ². For example, Lucas (1990) uses a value of
² 2 [0:5;5], while Jones et al. (1993) even take a value as high as 7.09 for
the upper limit of ². Similarly, the elasticity of vacancies in job matches °
has been estimated with British data and with US data by Pissarides (1986)
and Blanchard/Diamond (1989) ¯nding values of ° = 0:4 and ° = 0:6, re-
spectively. The latter value has been applied by Shi/Wen (1999) which our
benchmark calibration is based upon. Therefore, we carefully conclude that
5The qualitative e®ect of the in°ation rate on economic growth further depends on
the speci¯cation of the CIA constraint. If also investment purchases must be made with
currency, P(Ã0c + Ã1_ k) · M, in°ation has a more adverse e®ect on economic growth.
14empirical observations do not allow for the ¯rm conclusion that moderate
rates of in°ation and money growth well in excess of zero harm economic
growth in the presence of labor market frictions.
4 Dynamic welfare analysis of in°ation
In this section, the welfare costs of moderate rates of in°ation are examined.
As argued in the introduction, a sensible welfare analysis cannot ignore the
transition dynamics following a change in monetary policy. For this reason,
the dynamics are computed with the help of equations (21)-(25). The e®ects
of a permanent and unexpected increase of the quarterly money growth rate
from 1.3% to 3% at time 0 are graphed in ¯gure 3 for the variables c=k, ¼, n,
s, v, and g. The transition takes approximately 10 years. After this period,
the deviation of the endogenous variables employment n, the consumption-
capital ratio c=k, search e®ort s, and vacancies v are all less than 0.1% from
the new steady-state values (compare ¯gure 3).
In the new steady state, the values of c=k and s are lower than in the old
steady state due to increased in°ation tax, while the values of the new in-
°ation rate ¼, the growth rate g, employment n, and vacancies v are higher.
Immediately following the increase of money growth at time 0, the search
intensity s and consumption c fall by 10% and 7.5%, respectively. As em-
ployment n gradually builds up, agents reduce their search e®ort s further.
As a consequence, ¯rms can ¯ll their vacancies at a lower rate # and re-
duce their posting of vacancies. For this reason, vacancies overshoot their
new steady state value following a rise in in°ation ¼. During transition, the
growth rate also overshoots its new steady state value as i) agents increase
their savings and ii) employment builds up (even though vacancies fall).
15Figure 3: Transitional dynamics following an increase of ¹ to 3%
Welfare e®ects of a change in monetary policy are calculated by the change
in utility (1) of the representative agent. In particular, the welfare gain of
moving from allocation fc;s;ng
1
0 to allocation fc0;s0;n0g
1
0 will be measured
by the consumption equivalent increase ±c as suggested by McGrattan (1994):
Z 1
0









16There are three e®ects of a rise in the money growth rate on welfare. First,
the level of consumption decreases and consumption will be lower for many
years following the change in monetary policy. Second, agents increase leisure
instantaneously. Third, in the long run, consumption grows at a higher rate
(in our benchmark case). The net e®ect of change in the money growth rate
are graphed in ¯gure 4. For the benchmark calibration, the optimal money
growth rate is well above zero and equals 3.5%. The welfare gain from a
permanent change to the optimal rate of in°ation implies welfare gains equal
to ±c = 0:26%. Notice that the sign of the e®ect is opposite to the one found
in previous studies on monetary growth models such as Gomme (1993) and
Wu/Zhang (1998).
Figure 4: Welfare e®ects of moderate in°ation
Unsurprisingly, the optimal money growth rate depends crucially on the elas-
ticity of labor supply and the elasticity of vacancies in job matches. Table 2
summarizes the e®ects of moderate in°ation for di®erent values of (´;°). For
lower values of ´ and °, it may well be optimal to reduce the rate of in°ation
to zero (we only considered nonnegative in°ation rates, ¼ ¸ 0). The reduc-
tion of the quarterly in°ation rate from 0.95% to 0% for a lower, but still
17Table 2
Sensitivity analysis of optimal monetary policy
´ = 3:5 ´ = 3:5 ´ = 2:5 ´ = 2:5
° = 0:6 ° = 0:4 ° = 0:6 ° = 0:4
optimal nonnegative
in°ation rate 3.5% 0% 1.6% 0%
±c 0.26% 0.30% 0.02% 0.41%
empirically reasonable values of ´ = 2:5 and ° = 0:4 results in a welfare gain
of 0.41% of total consumption. Again, the analysis in this section suggests
that ¯rm conclusions about the qualitative e®ects of a zero-in°ation policy
on welfare are di±cult to obtain given the variety of empirical evidence on
the values of the labor supply elasticity and the elasticity of vacancies in job
matches.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the welfare costs of in°ation in a search equilib-
rium model. Our results challenge conventional wisdom that higher rates of
in°ation reduce growth and welfare unanimously. In fact, for our benchmark
calibration of the US economy, economic growth increases with moderate
rates of in°ation and the optimal quarterly in°ation rate amounts to 3.5%.
We show that two parameters from the labor market are crucial to the under-
standing of the qualitative e®ects of monetary policy. The lower the elasticity
of labor supply and the elasticity of vacancies in job matches, the more likely
is in°ation to have adverse e®ects on both economic growth and welfare.
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